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Abstract
In this paper we seek to build on existing mathematical studies of cultural
change by exploring how the diversity of adaptive cultural traits evolves
by innovation and cultural transmission when the payoff from adopting
traits is both uncertain and frequency dependent. The model is particu-
larly aimed at understanding the evolution of subsistence trait diversity,
since the payoff from exploiting particular resources is often variable and
subject to diminishing returns as a result of overexploitation. We find that
traits that exploit the same shared resource evolve most quickly when
intermediate rates of cultural transmission promote fluctuation in trait
diversity. Higher rates of cultural transmission, which promote predomi-
nantly low diversity, and lower rates, which promote predominantly high
diversity, both retard the adoption of traits offering higher payoff. We
also find that the distribution of traits that exploit independent resources
can evolve towards the theoretical Ideal Free Distribution so long as the
rate of cultural transmission is low. Increasing the rate of cultural trans-
mission reduces trait diversity, so that a more limited number of ‘niches’
are occupied at any given time.
KEYWORDS: Cultural Transmission; Innovation; Cultural Diversity; Sub-
sistence Strategies; Agent Based Modelling.
1 Motivation
The study of cultural change using concepts and mathematical tools borrowed
from the study of biological evolution is now well established [24], but as Kandler
and Laland [12] have recently observed, the relationship between innovation
and cultural diversity has received less attention, even though it is central to
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the history of anthropological thinking about how and why human behaviour
changes. In this paper we explore how innovation and cultural transmission
influence cultural diversity in adaptive traits when the payoff obtained from
adopting those traits is both uncertain and regulated by population dynamics.
Our interest in this problem stems from the fact that a central theme in
the archaeological investigation of human history is the evolution of subsistence
strategies, which can be modelled in terms of changing adaptive trait diversity
in at least two senses. One of these is nicely encapsulated in Layton et als’
[13] argument that hunting and gathering, herding, and cultivation should be
treated as different adaptive strategies rather than as an “evolutionary progres-
sion from one distinct type of society to another”. The difficulty of maintaining
the earlier social-evolutionist position is easily demonstrated by pointing to a
number of cases in which it appears that groups have switched strategies at
least once and in some cases repeatedly. For example, Schrire [23] has argued
that some San communities have oscillated between foraging and cattle herding
over several centuries or even millennia, while Mace [16] lists a number of in-
stances of groups switching back and forth between pastoralism and farming in
the Sudano-Sahelian belt. More recently, Oota et al [20] have presented genetic,
linguistic, and cultural evidence that the Thai Mlabri adopted hunting and gath-
ering despite having originated from an agricultural group, while in east Africa
the Dorobo, Masaai and Kikuyu are known to revert to hunting and gathering
after crop failure [11]. Layton et al [13] argued that switching between different
subsistence strategies could usefully be conceptualised in terms of the optimal
diet-breadth model [15, 22] because it explains when people would be expected
to switch from resources offering a high net energetic return after search and
handling costs (typically animal foods) to those offering a lower return (typically
plant resources).
The second sense in which evolution of subsistence systems can be modelled
in terms of changing adaptive trait diversity arises from the invocation of the
optimal diet-breadth model to explain the range of prey species exploited by
hunter-gatherers. Three basic predictions [22] of the diet-breadth model are
that: i) the decision whether to incorporate a food item into the diet is de-
termined by the abundance of higher-ranking food types rather than its own
encounter rate; ii) an increase in search efficiency will result in a reduction of
diet breadth; iii) an increase in pursuit efficiency will result in an expansion
of diet breadth. Behaviour consistent with all three predictions has been ob-
served in empirical studies. For example, Hames and Vickers [10] found that the
Amazonian Siona-Secoya, Ye’kwana, and Yanomamb incorporated food types
in their diet in rank order of net energetic return, but that the range of foods
exploited increased after their acquisition of guns reduced pursuit time. In con-
trast, Winterhalder [30] observed that the acquisition of snowmobiles by the
North American Cree greatly increased their search efficiency thereby allowing
them to concentrate more narrowly on higher ranked larger game offering a
higher rate of energetic return.
It is clear that the optimal diet-breadth model can explain at least some spe-
cific examples of the decision to hunt new types of prey and even the switching
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back-and-forth of modes of subsistence. More generally, however, its applica-
tion to human societies has lead to a better understanding of the complex re-
lationship between resource scarcity, technological innovation, diet breadth and
population size. The first lesson is that even purely selfish decision-making can
prevent the extinction of preferred resources due to overexploitation provided
that the declining return from those resources (due to increased search time)
is eclipsed by the return from lesser ranked resources before extinction of the
former [26]. The second lesson is that because technological innovation directly
influences search and/or handling costs it is often critical in determining which
or two or more resources offers the greatest net energetic return [10].
Despite its demonstrable utility, however, it is notable that applications of
the diet-breadth model typically relate to subsistence changes occurring over
what one might call an ethnographic time-scale (but see [32]). Specifically,
applications of the diet-breadth model essentially assume that the people al-
ready know the net-energetic return from all the resources available to them, in
other words, there is no need for technological innovation or it just ‘happens’.
Given our archaeological interest in explaining change over the long-term we
are acutely aware that subsistence trait diversity at any given time must be
a function of both the type of rational decision-making captured by the diet-
breadth model and the preceding history of subsistence technology. Moreover,
we suspect that the relationship between these forces is complicated by at least
two factors: i) that reliable assessment of a new technology is likely to be very
dependent upon the predictability of the resource that it is designed to exploit;
and ii) that, as Shennan [25] has demonstrated, new technologies are more likely
to be lost in smaller populations. The model we present in this paper is intended
to help us explore how these factors influence change in adaptive trait diversity
in evolutionary time, that is to say, over timescales where the adoption or loss
of innovations in subsistence strategy is itself part of the problem.
Our model of the evolution of adaptive trait diversity builds on the work of
Kandler and Laland [12] and Shennan [25]. The well-known explosion of cultural
diversity at the so-called Middle–Upper Palaeolithic transition in Europe[17]
motivated Shennan [25] to develop a mathematical model of the innovation and
spread of fitness enhancing craft skills. He modelled the fitness of an indi-
vidual as the multiplicative sum of fitnesses of each of a fixed number of craft
attributes and then allowed innovation to alter the fitness of each attribute. Cul-
tural transmission resulted in an individual copying the trait from the model
with highest fitness for that trait among an ‘effective’ population. A series of
simulation experiments revealed that fitness enhancing innovation is restricted
by deleterious sampling effects in small populations, but significantly enhanced
by cultural transmission in larger populations. As a result Shennan (p.13) noted
that “advantageous cultural change is at least as much a consequence as a cause
of increased population”, but because his model parameterises population size
he was not able to more formally explore the feedback between innovation and
population growth. In this paper we extend Shennan’s analysis in that direction
by allowing traits to determine the population growth rate. A further interest-
ing question raised by Shennan’s work stems from his observation that “it is
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highly unlikely that an individual would always be able to pick out the most
beneficial older individual to copy”. We incorporate this effect in our model by
introducing payoff variance.
Kandler and Laland [12] have recently presented a reaction-diffusion model
which describes the spread and changing diversity of competing cultural traits
within a growing population. They model the evolution of “n competing (mu-
tually exclusive) variants of a specific cultural trait within a population” (p.60)
where different variants confer different benefits on those who adopt them. New
variants arise by improvement of an existing variant or by independent inven-
tion, while the adoption of existing variants results from unbiased social learning
or various kinds of cultural transmission bias, including conformist bias. Kan-
dler and Laland’s primary interest is in the interplay between innovation and
cultural transmission and they report several interesting results which include
oscillating trends in diversity when innovation occurs by improvement as well as
the negative impact of conformity on diversity. While our interest overlaps (in-
deed, we replicate some of their findings, as noted later) our emphasis is more on
issues that arise directly out of our explicit concern with diversity in subsistence
strategies. For that reason we follow Shennan [25] in modelling just one type of
cultural transmission (payoff-biassed) and then focus our effort on the effects of
payoff variance and alternative models of competition between strategies.
The problem of estimating the true value of a resource is well known in the
optimal foraging literature [28] and has even been addressed in computer simu-
lation experiments stimulated by archaeological studies of subsistence behaviour
[18, 5]. When chance events cause the actual payoff from exploiting a given re-
source to fluctuate around the mean payoff individual organisms may struggle
to identify the true value of that resource. Moreover, when organisms copy
subsistence strategies from one another there is the possibility that they may
erroneously adopt a bad strategy or reject a good one, which may in turn have
unexpected consequences if the payoff from that strategy is frequency depen-
dent. For these reasons we take a different approach from Kandler and Laland,
who assume a fixed payoff; instead we model payoff as a stochastic variable such
that the payoff obtained by adopting a particular subsistence strategy is drawn
from a probability distribution associated with that strategy.
In Kandler and Laland’s model individuals with different traits compete for
a share of a single set of resources. This is of interest to us since it models
the situation where, for example, an individual innovates a new technology for
exploiting a resource already used by the group (such as the case of the snow-
mobile cited above). However, there is another scenario which is also relevant
in the context of subsistence: that where an individual innovates a new technol-
ogy which enables the exploitation of a new resource, either because it makes
it physically possible, or because it changes the cost/benefit calculation of the
value of that resource. In the first case there is direct competition between the
old and new subsistence strategies, but in the latter that is not the case. We
model both scenarios since they occur in applications of the diet-breadth model
to real-world ethnographic case studies.
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2 The model
Our model is designed to explore how the balance of innovation and payoff-
biassed transmission influences cultural trait diversity when the payoff from the
adoption of a specific trait has negative frequency dependence and is affected by
some degree of stochasticity. The cultural traits are ‘adaptive’ in the sense that
we envisage them being tools, technologies or strategies for exploiting subsis-
tence resources. We implement two variants of the model. In the S-mode model
agents with different traits compete for a share of a single resource pool, which
captures the real-world situation where, for example, an individual innovates a
new—possibly more efficient—technology for exploiting a resource already used
by the group. In the I-mode model agents with different traits exploit separate
resource pools, in this case capturing the real-world situation where an individ-
ual innovates a new technology which enables the exploitation of a previously
untapped resource.
We implement our model as a a discrete agent-based simulation (ABM). The
strengths and weaknesses of ABM versus continuous mathematical models have
been rehearsed elsewhere [7, 27, 14]; for our purposes the main benefit of using
an ABM is greater sensitivity to the risk of trait loss in small populations. Our
model implements a population of agents characterised by the following four
state variables: age (a), most recent payoff (φ), stored energy (E) and adopted
trait (j). Each run of the simulation is initialised by the creation of N agents
possessing identical initial state variables (apart from a). The state variables
are updated through a scheduled sequence of processes iterated through T time-
steps. At each time-step the payoff φ of each agent is evaluated. This modifies
the amount of stored energy E which in turn determines the probability of the
agent’s reproduction and survival. Each agent has the opportunity to modify
its trait j via innovation (with frequency µ), or cultural transmission (with
frequency z). Full details of the model can be found in the online supplementary
material; here we describe the main processes which drive the dynamics.
The core process of the model is the computation of the payoff (φi) received
by each agent i. This involves two stages. First, for each agent, a random
number ωi is drawn from a normal distribution with mean fj and standard
deviation vj , where j is an index value pointing at one of the θ possible traits
that can be adopted. Each trait has a different mean, with a higher index value
determining a higher expected payoff f , so that if x > y, then fx will be always
greater than fy. Variance is identical for all traits and is determined by the
global parameter v. The subsequent step is different for the S-mode model and
the I-mode model. In the former case the sum of all ω (Ω) is computed and
compared to K, the size of the shared resource pool. When Ω ≤ K, φi = ωi,
while when Ω > K, the agents are overexploiting the resource and the payoff of





In the I-mode model the same equation is applied independently for each
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trait. Thus Ω will be Ωj which is the sum of ω of all agents having the trait j,
while the resource pool is also trait specific (Kj instead of K).
For both modes, after φ is computed, the stored energy of each agent (Ei)
is updated by adding φi and then subtracting c, the latter representing the
resource consumption rate. Thus, when φi− c > 0, Ei will increase, while when
φi−c < 0, Ei will decrease. The stored energy plays a central role in determining
the reproductive fitness of each agent. When Ei ≤ 0, or when the age of the
agent (ai) exceeds d (representing the maximum age threshold), the agent dies.
On the other hand, when Ei ≥ 2s, where s is the basic stored energy, the agent
will have the opportunity to reproduce with probability r. When reproduction
occurs a new agent is created with the same trait as the parent (which assumes
unbiased vertical transmission), stored energy equal to s and a = 0; at the same
time the parent’s E is reduced by an amount equal to s. In the S-mode model,
when resource overexploitation occurs traits with lower f are more likely to have
φ− c close to or below zero, which will increase the effect of natural selection by
reducing the likelihood of reproduction and increasing mortality. In the case of
the I-mode model, trait payoffs exhibit internal negative frequency dependence,
so it is possible for a trait with a higher expected payoff (f) to produce lower
φ as a result of trait-specific overexploitation, thereby potentially producing a
smaller payoff than an alternative trait with lower f but which is not affected
by overexploitation.
In order to maximise φ each agent i can change its strategy via cultural
transmission, which is triggered with a fixed probability z and involves a two-
step process. First, an individual m with the highest φ among k randomly
sampled agents is chosen as a model. Then, if φi < φm, the focal agent copies
the trait adopted by the model agent. This process is very similar to the model
proposed by Shennan [25], although we use the simple expedient of fixing k to
150, based on Dunbar’s number [6]. Clearly, when the population size, n, is
below k then the latter will be set to n.
Individual agents innovate novel traits with frequency µ. When the sim-
ulation is initialised, a trait space of length θ is created. This represents the
possible range of traits j = 1 . . . j = θ that an agent can adopt, each with its
own expected payoff fj and, in the case of the I-mode model, a resource pool
of size Kj . When innovation occurs, the focal agent adopts a new trait whose
index is the index of the old trait plus the floor of a randomly generated number
from a reflected exponential distribution with rate parameter λ. This model of
innovation is close to that previously proposed by Shennan [25], and assumes
that innovation:-
1. Is path dependent, so that the current trait determines the range of traits
that might be adopted subsequently via innovation;
2. Is stepwise, with frequent small changes and less frequent large changes;
3. Is bi-directional, so that there is a possibility of adopting maladaptive
traits (i.e. δ could be negative);
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4. Can be repetitive, in that the same trait can be ‘invented’ on multiple
occasions by the same or different agents.
3 Experimental Design
Every simulation is initialised with 100 agents, each with a randomly assigned
age a between 0 and 0.5d, a stored energy equal to s and an initial trait set
to 41. 1 For both S-mode and I-mode models, the trait-space had θ = 141,
with mean payoff ranging between 8.0 (f1 ) and 15.0 (f141), with an interval
of 0.05. In the S-mode model all traits shared a common resource pool of
size K = 5000, while in the I-mode model each independent resource pool Kj
had an equal size of 1000. All simulations were run for 1000 time-steps, of
which the first 200 were dedicated to the simulation ‘warm-up’. During this
stage innovation and cultural transmission were disabled, allowing the model
to reach an equilibrium population size and to allow the creation of different
life-histories among the agents, which provided more realistic variability in the
system. In the S-mode model we explored the variation of parameters z, µ and
v, while for the I-mode we swept only z. Exact values of the parameter sweep
can be found in table 1. For both modes we conducted 50 simulation runs for
each combination of parameters, which we consider sufficient on the basis of an
incremental convergence test of up to 500 runs.
Kandler and Laland [12] discuss several possible measures of trait diversity.
We use Simpson’s diversity Index (D˜), which takes account of the relative fre-
quency with which those traits occur, such that the state of maximum diversity
(D˜=1) is one in which all possible traits are present in equal proportion, while
the minimum diversity (D˜=0) is one in which only one trait is adopted. This
seems to us preferable to a simple trait count because from an evolutionary
perspective the diversity of a population in which some traits occur with very
low frequency is likely to be less robust than the diversity of a population in
which the frequency of traits is more evenly distributed.
4 Results
4.1 S-mode
Figure 1 records the change in trait diversity over time under regimes of nat-
ural selection alone (z = 0.0) and two different rates of cultural transmission
(z = 0.2 and (z = 1.0). The plot depicts the results from individual simulations
because averaging across multiple runs masks the interesting periodicities, but
the dynamics are very representative of the full set of results from 50 runs. In
the long-run natural selection alone produces high and essentially constant trait
diversity (D˜>0.8), whereas cultural transmission produces strong fluctuations.
1Preliminary runs of the model have shown that with the parameter combination specified
in table 1 and no innovation, when j = 41 (and f41 = 10) the population grows to an
equilibrium around the size set at initialisation.
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When all agents rely on cultural transmission at every time-step (z = 1.0) diver-
sity is generally very low, albeit punctuated by very brief periods of moderate
diversity, derived by episodes of innovation in a relatively low population. When
agents are less reliant on cultural transmission (z = 0.2) the major fluctuations
in diversity are of greater magnitude and persist for longer.
Figure 2 shows the same data depicted in figure 1 for z = 0.2 between t = 300
and t = 500, thereby allowing closer investigation of the dynamics of one cycle of
oscillation in diversity. Figure 2a clearly illustrates the fluctuation in Simpson’s
diversity, while figure 2b presents a violin plot of the actual trait distribution.
Given that successively numbered traits have higher expected payoff (f), it can
be seen from figure 2b that ‘better’ traits were ultimately adopted. It is also
clear, however, that this expected improvement was not gradual, but strongly
punctuated, such that before most of the agents adopted a novel trait with higher
expected payoff there was an intermediate episode of a relatively higher diversity
where the trait distribution was multimodal, with intermediate traits between
the peaks ignored by the majority of the individuals. Specifically, in this case,
at t = 300 − 340 the majority of the agents had adopted either trait 41 or 44,
and very few had adopted the intermediate traits 42 and 43. Subsequently, at
circa t = 340, almost the entire population adopted trait 44 and this remained
the predominant choice until t = 450. Interestingly, during this interval of low
trait diversity, several individuals innovated and temporarily adopted traits that
were expected to have a higher payoff than trait 44, but these were not adopted
by the majority of the population and were soon abandoned by the innovators
themselves. From t = 450, trait 47 became increasingly common, leading again
to a bimodal distribution similar to the one seen around t = 300.
The punctuated dynamics shown in figures 1 and 2 can be explained by the
combination of the payoff variance (parameter v) and the sampling effect due
to the size of the sub-population k. Suppose that at a given moment in time
the entire population has adopted trait A. Now suppose an individual agent
innovates and adopts the trait B, with fB > fA. This means trait B produces
on average a higher payoff than trait A and should therefore be adopted. At
this point an agent who decides to copy the most successful trait will sample k
individuals from the population and, if it is lucky, the innovator will be among
the k individuals. However, the likelihood that the innovator will be chosen
as the model depends not only k, but also the payoff variance v. If v is high
enough, there is a real chance that some agents with trait A will obtain a higher
payoff than the innovator’s, so the innovation will not be adopted. In the same
way, the innovator itself may abandon the new trait and revert back to A. In
order to allow the population to adopt trait B, the difference between fB and
fA should be sufficiently high to reduce the effect of v, and at the same time,
the rate of cultural transmission should not be too high in order to allow the
new trait to spread —either by vertical transmission (reproduction) or cultural
transmission— before the innovator reverses back to A.
From an archaeological perspective the fluctuations in diversity evident in
figures 1 and 2 would only be visible in the—perhaps all too rare—cases for
which high resolution time-series data is available. In many cases archaeological
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sequences suffer from numerous gaps and/or units of observation that are of
unequal chronological duration, with the result that assemblages of artefacts or
other material often aggregate the results of more than one stage in the evolution
of the phenomenon being studied. For this reason it may be helpful to consider
the overall frequency with which the evolving system exhibits different degrees of
diversity. In figure 3 we follow Kandler and Laland [12] in plotting the frequency
distribution of different values of diversity, in this case for natural selection (z =
0) and four different rates of cultural transmission (z > 0). It is clear that the
system is mostly in a state of very high diversity (D˜>0.8) when trait evolution
is driven by natural selection alone or a lower rate of cultural transmission, and
that the reverse is true when the rate of cultural transmission is higher (D˜<0.1).
The more uniform, but nevertheless weakly bimodal distribution 2 of diversity
recorded for z=0.1 is consistent with the larger and more persistent fluctuations
in diversity associated with an intermediate rate of cultural transmission (see
figure 1).
Having established the basic dynamic of trait evolution, we now turn to
the question of the impact of innovation rate (µ), rate of cultural transmission
(z) and payoff variance (v) on the rate of cultural evolution3. The frequency
distribution (among 50 simulation runs) of the median trait at the final time-step
provides a measure of how far the agents have explored the trait space in the time
available (figure 4). When v = 0 and thus when there is no stochastic component
in the payoff evaluation, higher transmission rates produce a considerably higher
rate of cultural evolution. When µ = 0.005, the highest possible trait (141) is
adopted by time-step t = 1000 in almost all simulations, except for cases where
cultural transmission was low or absent(z < 0.1). When the rate of innovation is
higher (µ = 0.05) this pattern is even more evident, with trait 141 being adopted
in almost all simulations even when 0 < z > 0.1. This result is consistent with
analytical models (e.g. [3]) which predict that the coupling of natural selection
and social learning should increase the rate of cultural evolution.
More interesting here, however, is the different result obtained when v > 0.
The first point to note is that in all instances the median terminal trait is
considerably lower, with trait 141 never reached. Second, in some cases the
relation between z and the terminal median trait appears to be non-monotonic.
The positive correlation between the two, which was evident when v = 0, only
holds for low values of z, after which increasing the rate of cultural transmission
has a negative effect on the evolution of traits offering higher mean payoff. The
2The presence of a decrease in the frequency at ca D˜=0.02 for certain values of z (e.g.
z=0.01,0.1 and 0.3) is caused by the discrete nature of the simulation and the rate of innova-
tion. For instance, suppose that the population size is 500 and all agents have the same trait:
when innovation occurs, an average of 5 individuals will adopt a novel trait, which means that
in most cases D˜ will be 0.0198, and smaller values can be obtained only when the number of
innovator is less than 5.
3We use ‘rate of cultural evolution’ to refer to the rapidity with which the trait space is
explored. In adopting this terminology we are, however, aware that although higher j poten-
tially yield higher payoffs, this does not guarantee that agents with higher j are reproductively
fitter (e.g. if there is overexploitation), and nor do we mean to imply that cultural evolution
is necessarily a fitness enhancing process.
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point of inflection where the effect of z is reversed depends on the combination of
µ and v and is quite marked in some cases (e.g. µ = 0.05 and v = 1) and barely
perceptible in others (µ = 0.005 and v = 3). These results are consistent with
the dynamics we suggested above. High enough rates of cultural transmission
can cause an innovator to revert to an earlier trait before the true mean payoff of
the novel trait has been established, whereas a lower rate of cultural transmission
reduces the likelihood that the innovator will engage in social learning, thereby
prolonging the opportunity for the innovator to both reproduce and act as a
model for other agents. Both the latter processes can increase the frequency of
the novel trait, which will in turn reduce the sampling effect described above.
The results also clearly demonstrate that an increase in the innovation rate
has the opposite effect of an increase in payoff variance, so the optimal rate of
cultural transmission is ultimately determined by the interaction between both
factors. This result provides a formal demonstration of the argument [19, 21]
that the optimal balance of individual learning and social learning should shift
towards the former as the environment becomes less predictable.
4.2 I-mode
When the adoption of novel traits facilitates the exploitation of different inde-
pendent resources, the advantage deriving from adopting a trait with a higher
mean payoff f is potentially diminished or negated once the sum of payoffs
sought by agents who have adopted that trait exceeds the size of the resource
pool associated with it (i.e. Ωj > Kj). Recall that this situation is modelled by
equation 1 applied to each trait in turn, thus if there are two traits A and B,
with fA < fB and KA = KB , then so long as ΩB < KB the payoff obtained by
agents adopting trait B will on average be larger than that obtained by those
adopting A. When this condition is not satisfied, however, then the average φ
of agents adopting trait A could be higher if ΩA < KA, potentially leading to
a reversion to trait A as a result of cultural transmission. When multiple traits
are overexploited, the term ωiΩ in equation 1 approximates to the reciprocal of
the number of agents who have adopted the particular trait (1/nj), thus the
difference in φ becomes primarily a function of Kj and nj rather than fj . It
follows that, under conditions of overexploitation, all n agents will receive the
same payoff provided that the number adopting each trait is proportional to
the size of the resource pool associated with that trait. One would thus expect
the long-term equilibrium distribution of traits to be one in which all traits
are adopted in proportion to the size of their associated resource pool. This is
also the expectation of the Ideal Free Distribution (IFD) model [29, 32], which
predicts that the stable equilibrium for resource exploitation in a given envi-
ronment is one in which the number of individuals occupying each subsistence
niche is proportional to the quantity of resources available in that niche.
There is, however, a fundamental difference between our model and the
Ideal Free Distribution model: the ‘ideal’ assumption is violated by the fact
that our agents do not have perfect information about the value of different
traits, and hence they have to rely on innovation and cultural transmission to
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explore the trait-space. This difference derives from our interest in the evolution
of subsistence strategies: the fact that subsistence trait diversity is likely to be a
function of the preceding history of subsistence technology as well as the kinds
of rational decision-making captured by the diet-breadth model and the IFD
model. In other words, given the factors influencing the innovation and spread
of traits, it is not self-evident that the expectations of models such as the IFD
will always be met, and even if they are, there may be unexpected dynamics
en-route to the predicted long-term equilibrium.
In order to investigate the temporal pattern of trait adoption (niche ex-
ploration), we investigate trait richness in terms of the width of the envelope
containing all traits from that offering the lowest payoff to that offering the
highest payoff. Figure 5a depicts the time-series of the upper and lower-bound
of the trait distribution for two different rates of cultural transmission, z, and
reveals several interesting results. First, in both cases, traits offering lower pay-
off are lost through time. Second, the width of the trait envelope associated
with the two different values of z is very different. Third, the lower rate of cul-
tural transmission produces faster cultural evolution in the sense that it leads
to the more rapid adoption of traits offering a higher payoff. Figure 5b extends
the analysis to additional values of z by plotting the width of the associated
trait envelope at three moments in time (t=400, 700 and 1000). This reveals a
non-monotonic relation between z and the rate of cultural evolution. Increasing
the rate of cultural transmission from z = 0 to z = 0.05 increases the speed with
which the population ‘discovers’ the trait offering the highest payoff, although it
also reduces the number of traits that are maintained in the population. Further
increase in z reduces the rate of cultural evolution, to the extent that for z > 0.2
the trait offering the highest payoff is not discovered within 1000 time-steps; it
also narrows the trait envelope to the point where it remains constant in width
(z = 1.0).
The process responsible for the pattern depicted in figure 5 can be explored
by plotting the changing population size of the most prevalent traits during a
single run of the simulation. Figure 6 illustrates this for z = 0.5 in a narrow
temporal window of 40 time-steps. The population curves reveal continuous
switching back and forth between two traits, initially 48 and 49 and then, after
a brief appearance by trait 51, traits 49 and 52. What we see here is the effect
of excessive reliance on cultural transmission: thus trait 49 is initially the most
common, but the payoff declines as this ‘niche’ fills up, eventually leading more
agents to revert back to trait 48, which has lower f but will, for the reasons
discussed above, have higher φ. Then, as more agents switch to trait 48, Ω48
becomes larger and Ω49 smaller, resulting in a relative increase in φ49 and a
renewed preference for trait 49. This cyclical pattern is eventually interrupted
by the emergence of trait 51, after which there is a period of fluctuation be-
tween trait 49 and 52. It appears that the effect of cultural transmission on
this dynamic is as follows. When z is relatively low the opportunity to switch
traits is reduced, with the result that traits offering lower payoff are always
‘maintained’ by a subset of the population. These traits will in fact be contin-
uously re-adopted whenever a novel trait with higher f is being overexploited.
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Consequently, lower z promotes both the continuous adoption of traits with
lower f and the adoption of novel higher f traits without the risk of reversion
and subsequent loss from the population. Conversely, higher z increases the
opportunity for reversion, thereby narrowing the width of the trait envelope
and increasing the possibility of trait loss, thus ultimately reducing the rate of
cultural evolution.
The pattern of alternation between two traits, involving reversion to traits
with lower f as a consequence of resource overexploitation, has been predicted
by several optimal foraging theoretic models [1, 31], although these assume both
full knowledge of the available resources and the possibility of exploiting multiple
resources. Our model adds an understanding of how adaptive trait switching in
a population is mediated by the rate of cultural transmission. In particular, our
results suggest that the rate of cultural transmission has a significant effect on
the likelihood of obtaining the Ideal Free Distribution in situations where the
exploitation of new resources requires innovation.
5 Conclusions
Our S-mode conceptual model shares many similarities with Kandler and La-
land’s [12] recent model of trait evolution, so it is reassuring that implemen-
tations using different modelling paradigms (a reaction-diffusion model and an
agent-based simulation) should yield some similar results, even though one in-
corporates 6 traits (Kandler and Laland) and the other 141 traits (our model).
Like Kandler and Laland, we find that adaptive traits that exploit the same,
shared, resource undergo punctuated evolution: periods of low diversity and
little or no change in trait distribution are interrupted by periods of higher
diversity during which the distribution typically becomes multimodal before co-
alescing around a new trait with higher expected payoff. We also find that the
rate of cultural transmission strongly influences the amplitude and frequency of
changes in diversity.
Nevertheless, the motivation for our work is different from Kandler and
Laland’s in that we are primarily concerned with the evolution of particular
class of adaptive trait: subsistence strategies. In our introduction we noted
the power of diet-breadth models to explain diversity in subsistence strategies,
but also asked how cultural evolutionary processes might promote or retard
the ability of populations to achieve predicted outcomes. For this reason we
created a model which allowed us to study the efficacy of cultural evolution
for improving payoff, how this is influenced by payoff variance and how the
evolutionary dynamics differ for traits that facilitate the exploitation of different
independent resources rather than one shared resource. We draw the following
conclusions from our model:-
1. The amount of payoff variance substantially alters the frequencies of cul-
tural transmission and innovation required to effect the rapid cultural
evolution of adaptive traits. Higher rates of cultural transmission are ad-
vantageous when there is zero payoff variance, but in the presence of even
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modest payoff variance they are deleterious in the sense that, after a given
duration, the population may have adopted traits that yield lower payoff
than would have been the case had trait adoption been driven by natu-
ral selection alone. However, increasing the innovation rate enhances the
efficacy of cultural transmission when payoff variance is high.
2. When payoff variance is non-zero the relationship between the rate of cul-
tural transmission and the rate of cultural evolution of adaptive traits (i.e.
the speed with which the trait offering the highest payoff is ‘discovered’) is
not monotonic. The lowest and highest rates of cultural transmission re-
tard the rate of cultural evolution relative to intermediate rates of cultural
transmission.
3. Rapid cultural evolution is associated with variability in trait diversity.
Permanently low trait diversity, caused by the highest rates of cultural
transmission, and permanently high diversity, caused by the lowest rates
of cultural transmission, are both associated with slower adoption of traits
offering higher expected payoff.
4. The distribution of adaptive traits that exploit independent resources
evolves to a state close to the theoretical Ideal Free Distribution only
if the rate of cultural transmission is relatively low. Higher rates of cul-
tural transmission reduce trait diversity, so that a more limited number
of ‘niches’ are occupied at any given time. We have demonstrated that
this effect is a direct result of excessive reliance on cultural transmission,
which results in increased episodes of trait reversion and ultimately trait
loss.
Although we are confident in the conclusions drawn from our model, we
are aware that there are plausible alternative assumptions under which they
might not hold. First, we explain conclusions 1 and 2 in terms of sampling
error causing the early loss of innovations. This is a function of payoff variance,
but also the size of the subpopulation, k, that provides potential models for
cultural transmission. A different value of k, or the imposition of demic or
network structure, or a different mode of cultural transmission might all alter
the outcome.
Second, the strict resource independence of traits in the I-mode model should
be considered a limiting case, since in many real world contexts some degree
of inter-relationship between traits is likely, such that overexploitation in one
niche is likely to at least partially affect the availability of resources in others.
Third, our model assumes that each agent adopts a single trait. This is a
widely accepted convention in models of cultural transmission, but is at odds
with behavioural ecology models such as the diet breadth model, where multi-
ple resources are exploited by single individuals. Whether allowing individuals
to adopt multiple traits ultimately alters population-level trait diversity is a
question which merits further investigation.
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Finally, one could argue that the S-mode and I-mode models are not really
mutually exclusive, but represent different stages in the hierarchical exploration
of trait space. In this case I-mode innovation opens up new subsistence niches
while S-mode innovation improves exploitation within an existing niche, rather
as Boden [2] differentiated between ‘impossibilist’ creativity and ‘improbabilist’
creativity. The two types of innovation will be structured in a hierarchically
and nested trait-space, where path-dependence will determine different evolu-
tionary trajectories [4]. A given S-mode innovation designed to exploit a specific
type of resource might in fact enhance or inhibit—depending on its intrinsic
properties—the probability of an I-mode innovation.
Notwithstanding the scope for further investigation, our model demonstrates
how payoff variance, the rate of cultural transmission and the innovation rate
combine to alter the rate of cultural evolution of adaptive traits, and thus to
promote or retard the ability of populations to achieve optimal diversity in
subsistence strategies.
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Table 1: Model parameters, default values and sweep range. z swept in S-mode
for 0,0.01,0.025,0.05,0.075,0.1,0.125,0.15,0.175,0.2,0.25,0.3,0.5 and 1.0. z swept
in I-mode for 0.0, 0.01,0.05,0.1,0.2,0.3,0.5 and 1.0. f swept with interval of 0.05.
Parameter Name Abbreviation Default Value Sweep (S-Mode) Sweep (I-Mode)
Initial Number of Agents N 100 - -
Reproduction Rate r 0.2 - -
Resource Consumption c 8 - -
Basic Storage s 20 - -
Maximum Age d 20 - -
Innovation Rate µ 0.05 0.005,0.05 -
Rate Parameter of Innovation Step λ 1 - -
Maximum number of observed agents k 150 - -
Cultural Transmission Rate z - 0.1-1.0 0.1-1.0
Shared Resource Pool Size K 5000 - -
Independent Resource Pool Size Ki 1000 - - -
Trait Average Payoff f 8-15 - -
Trait Variance v 1 0,1,3 -
Length of Trait Space θ 141 - -
Initial Trait - 41 - -
Time-steps T 1000 - -






























Figure 1: Change in trait diversity over time for single simulations each with a
different rate of cultural transmission, z (v = 1, r = 0.2, µ = 0.01.)
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Figure 2: Change in trait diversity from t = 300 to t = 500 for a single simulation
with z = 0.2, displayed as: a) a plot of Simpson’s Index; b) a violin plot of the
trait distribution.
18


























Figure 3: Frequency distribution of the amount of diversity, as measured by
Simpson’s Index, for 5 different rates of cultural transmission, z (µ = 0.01,




























































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4: Distribution of the terminal median trait for 14 different rates of
cultural transmission, z, with 2 rates of innovation, µ, and 2 amounts of payoff
variance, v. (r = 0.2; total of 50 runs.)
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Figure 5: (a) The upper and lower bound of the trait envelope for 2 different
rates of cultural transmission, z. (b) The width of the trait envelope at t= 400,
700 and 1000 for 8 different rates of cultural transmission, z. (v = 1, r = 0.2,
µ = 0.05 and K = 1000 for each trait. The results are from 50 runs of the
simulation.)
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Figure 6: The population size of the four most prevalent traits during a 40 time-




ODD Protocol of the ABM
The following model description is based on the ODD (Overview, Design, Detail)
protocol described by Grimm and colleagues [8, 9].
1. PURPOSE
The purpose of the model is to explore the spread and the distribution of
adaptive traits via model-biased cultural transmission. Although the basic
structure of the model remains constant, two different modes have been
created based on whether different traits exploit independent resource
pools (I-mode) or a single shared resource pool (S-mode). Both models
were specifically designed to explore the effects of innovation, population
dynamics, frequency dependence and stochasticity in the distribution and
diversity of traits adopted by a population.
2. ENTITIES, STATE VARIABLES, AND SCALES
The model consists of n agents, each possessing four state variables: age
(a), amount of stored energy (E), most recent payoff (φ) and adopted
trait (j). The first three variables are updated at each time-step, while the
adopted trait can change only through innovation or cultural transmission.
The model is tuned by the following set of parameters:
• Fitness related parameters:
– Rate of reproduction (range:0-1,r)
– Amount of resource consumption (c)
– Initial/Basic stored amount of energy (s)
– Age limit (d)
• Innovation related parameters:
– Innovation rate (range:0-1,µ)
– Rate parameter of innovation step (λ)
• Cultural transmission related parameters
– Rate of cultural transmission (range:0-1,z)
– Maximum number of observed agents (k)
• Trait-space related parameters
– Trait index (j)
– Length of trait-space (number of traits, θ)
– Trait average payoff (fj)
– Trait variance (v)
– Shared resource pool size (for the S-mode models, K)
– Trait-specific resource pool size (for the I-mode models, Ki)
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– Trait adopted at initialisation (α)
• General parameters
– Number of agents at initialisation (N)
– Length of the warm up stage (w)
– Overall duration of each run (i.e. number of time-steps, T )
3. PROCESS OVERVIEW AND SCHEDULING
The model proceeds through a sequence of time-steps (1 to T ) where
decision making and state variables are updated. The first W time-steps
are dedicated to the ‘warm-up’ of the model, where the agent will neither
innovate nor copy other agents trait/strategy and will instead only proceed
through the following sequence of sub-processes: (1) Ageing; (2) Death;
(3) Reproduction; and (4) Payoff Evaluation. After W time-steps, this
sequence will be updated with two new sub-processes as follow: (1) Ageing;
(2)Death; (3)Reproduction; (4) Innovation; (5) Cultural Transmission;
and (6) Payoff Evaluation.
4. DESIGN CONCEPTS
Basic Principles
The model implements a variant of the model-biassed transmission
and innovation proposed by Shennan [25]. Most differences have
marginal impacts (e.g. using a reflected exponential distribution in-
stead of a reflected gamma distribution), however the critical differ-
ence is determined by the fact that the adoption of a trait determines
the reproductive fitness of its owner (thus agents can die and/or re-
produce), the payoff derived by the trait is stochastic and it has a
negative frequency dependence triggered in case of overexploitation.
Emergence
The dynamics of change in the distribution of traits along with changes
in population sizes are all emergent properties of the system derived
by the decision making of each agent.
Adaptation
The agent adapts to the environment by modifying their trait through
cultural transmission and innovation.
Objectives
The main objective of each agent is to maximise the payoff obtained
each time-step. This will lead to an improvement of its reproductive
fitness.
Learning
The agents can modify their traits either by innovation (with fre-
quency µ) or by social learning (with frequency z). The former will
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determine the unconditional adoption of a novel trait, which could be
equally deleterious or advantageous. The latter will involve a direct
comparison of the focal agents’ foraging success and a model agent’s
success, with the latter being the individual with the highest current
payoff among k randomly sampled individuals from the population.
The trait of the model agent will be copied only if its payoff is higher
than the one of the focal agents. Furthermore agents do not pos-
sess memory of traits adopted previously, nor do they recall the past
evaluations of observed samples. Thus agents might adopt the same
trait multiple times through re-innovation or cultural transmission.
Sensing
The agents have complete knowledge of recent payoff and strategy
of k random agents every time a successful draw from a Bernoulli
distribution with probability z occurs. Notice also that the sampled
agents will be different each time.
Interaction
No direct interaction between individuals occurs. However agents can
indirectly determine the reduction in the payoff other agents when
overexploitation occurs.
Stochasticity
Stochastic components are widely present in the model. These are:
(a) definition of the agents’ state variable a at the initialisation as a
random draw from an uniform distribution (bounded by 0 and
0.5d),
(b) bernoulli draws for triggering innovation and cultural transmis-
sion (with success probabilities µ and z),
(c) random sampling of the observed agents (with size k),
(d) payoff evaluation (random draw from a normal distribution with
mean fj and standard deviation v),
(e) exploration of the trait space through innovation (random draw
from a discrete reflected exponential distribution, with rate pa-
rameter λ).
Collectives
Strictly speaking no collectives are present in the model. However
when recent payoff is evaluated in the I-mode model, agents possess-
ing the same trait are treated as a group exploiting the same niche.
This means that in case of overexploitation, the reduction in the
payoff is restricted to individuals exploiting the same trait.
Observations
During each simulation the following data is collected:
(a) total number of agents,
(b) number of individuals adopting each existing trait,
(c) highest and lowest trait adopted by the population,
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(d) median trait,





where θ is the total number of possible traits, and pj is the
relative proportion of trait j.
5. INITIALISATION
The model is initialised by the creation of N agents, with each agent i
having a random age a between 0 and 0.5d, Ei = s, and the initial trait
α.
6. INPUT DATA
No external time-varying data are input in the model.
7. SUB-MODELS
Reproduction and Death
Reproduction occurs at frequency r when the agent’s storage (E) is
at least twice the initial storage value s. When a child is created,
the parent’s storage is reduced by s. The child will have the parent’s
trait (which mimics vertical transmission) , have a = 0 and E = s.
Death will occur when the agent’s age is greater than d, or when
E ≤ 0.
Payoff Evaluation
The payoff (φi) for an agent i is evaluated as follow. First, the
contribution ωi of each agent is defined as a random draw from a
normal distribution with mean fj and standard deviation v where j





where Ωj is the sum of all ωi of individual adopting the trait j.
In the S-mode, φi is then computed as follows:
if Ω ≤ K, φi = ωi




which essentially leads to a proportional share of the resource pool in
case of overexploitation. In the case of I-mode, equation (3) becomes
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trait specific, and thus Ω is substituted by Ωj , and K by Kj . Thus
in this case the overexploitation of the resource pool affects only the
individuals possessing the same trait. Payoff is then reduced by an
amount c, corresponding to the consumption rate, before being added
to stored energy E.
Innovation
Innovation occurs when a bernoulli draw with probability µ is suc-
cessful. The agent will change its current trait by ‘moving’ in the
trait space by an amount equal to δ, the floor of a number randomly
drawn from a reflected exponential distribution with rate parameter
equal to λ. This means that the majority of innovation will deter-
mine small positive or negative move in the trait space, with some
rare instance of ‘jumps’ in both directions occurring with a frequency
negatively correlated to λ.
Cultural Transmission
Cultural transmission occurs with frequency z and is structured in
three parts. First, k random individuals are sampled from the pop-
ulation, and the agent with the highest recent payoff is chosen as a
model. Second, the payoff received by the model is compared to the
agent’s own most recent payoff. Third, depending on the outcome of
the comparison, the focal agent will decide to copy (if its φ is lower
than the model’s) or to maintain its own trait (if its φ is higher or
equal to the model’s). The process can be regarded as guided form of
model biased transmission. The actual update of the adopted trait
occurs synchronically at the end of the subprocess. This ensures
that the agents evaluates the right combination of trait and payoff.
In computational terms this is accomplished by generating a copy of
all agents to which the actual observation refers to, with the actual
updating of the traits occurring to the original set.
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